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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the transfer from the Utah Supreme
Court under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4).
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
This appeal presents the following issues:
1.

In a circumstance such as this, where plaintiff, as the employee of a

subcontractor, failed to follow safe work procedures and caused injury to himself, did the
general contractor, Jacobsen Construction, actively participate in plaintiffs work so that a
duty to protect plaintiff from his own errors arose under the standard established by the
Utah Supreme Court in the case of Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d 322 (Utah 1999)?
2.

Under the undisputed facts, is there any evidence that Jacobsen

Construction breached its alleged duty or proximately caused plaintiffs injury?
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The Court reviews the District Court's Order granting Summary Judgement
for correctness. Surety Underwriters v. E&C Trucking, Inc., 10 P.3d 338 (Utah 2000).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, RULES,
ORDINANCES OR REGULATIONS
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or
regulations whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Nature of the Case.
Plaintiff, Russell Martinez, was a union steel worker employed by a

structural steel subcontractor. He fell and was injured on the job, in part because he was
violating his company's rule and not using fall protection. After collecting worker's
compensation benefits, he sued Jacobsen Construction alleging in substance that as the
general contractor it had a duty to prevent him from violating safe work practices and
injuring himself.
I.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below:
Upon completion of discovery, Jacobsen Construction filed a Motion for

Summary Judgement on the ground that as a matter of law it had breached no duty to the
plaintiff and plaintiffs claim was without merit. (R. 177 through 179). Following
submission of briefs and arguments, the Trial Court granted the Motion for Summary
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Judgement and entered an Order dated December 15, 2003 dismissing plaintiffs
Complaint.
B.

Statement of Facts.

I.

Jacobsen Did Not Actively Participate in the Steel Erection Operations:
1.

The accident at issue occurred on September 11,1997 at a building

construction site known as the UPC Building at 4020 South 500 West in Salt Lake City,
Utah. (R. 2). Defendant Jacobsen Construction was the general contractor for the
construction of the building. (R. 2). Jacobsen Construction subcontracted the supply and
erection of steel columns and girders for the building to Masco, Inc. Masco, Inc. in turn
subcontracted the erection of the steel to Steel Deck Erectors. (R. 424).
2.

Because of the size of the job, Steel Deck Erectors brought in Truco

(owned by a family member) to help with the erection work. (R. 424).
3.

Plaintiff, Russell Martinez, nephew of Patrick Trujillo, the owner of

Steel Deck Erectors, was one of the iron workers employed by Truco on the job.
Martinez was the foreman for Truco and the top person for the company on safety issues.
He was the "competent person" on the job for Truco as required by OSHA. (R. 436
through 437).
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4.

Martinez was instructed that this job was to be a "100% tie-off job."

That means that when a worker is up on the steel, he is required to always be attached to a
safety line so that if he falls he will not be hurt. Martinez violated that rule. (R. 182).
5.

The steel erection subcontract provided that the subcontractor was

responsible for safety equipment, training and procedures with regard to the steel
erection. The contract stated:
Subcontractor agrees to provide its employees with safe tools,
equipment, etc.; to provide them with a safe place to work; to
perform the work under this agreement in a safe manner with
a high regard for the safety of its employees and others; and to
comply with prevailing safety regulations whether Federal,
State, Local or otherwise imposed. Whenever the
subcontractor is working on the project, it shall have on-site a
competent safety representative who, in addition to his other
duties, shall be responsible for implementing and
administrating subcontractor's safety program, including
consistent safety training of subcontractor's employees and
holding documented weekly job site safety meetings with its
employees. Contractor shall have the right (but not the duty)
to review said documentation. Subcontractor shall
immediately remedy any unsafe conditions brought to its
attention or discovered by subcontractor involving its work
and/or posing a danger to persons or property.
(R.201).
6.

Under the arrangement with Masco, Inc., Steel Deck Erectors and

Truco took on the responsibility for safety equipment and procedures in the steel erection.
4

(R. 183). It was part of their job to install the safety lines for the men working up on the
steel. Truco and Steel Deck Erectors were the experts on the safety line systems. They
owned the safety equipment that was being used. They had used it on other jobs.
Plaintiff Martinez, along with his fellow Truco employees, personally mounted the safety
equipment on the steel girders. Jacobsen Construction did not give any direction on how
to install or use the safety line systems. (R. 183, 396, 400 and 438).
7.

Plaintiff Martinez did not receive any instructions in performing his

job functions from Jacobsen Construction. (R. 184 and 394). All of the instructions that
Martinez received were from his cousin Steve Trujillo, the Foreman for Steel Deck
Erectors. Steve Trujillo decided when the crews started work, when they quit work, when
to take lunch breaks, and gave Mr. Martinez and the others instructions. (R. 394). No
one from Jacobsen Construction gave Mr. Martinez any direction on how to do his job.
(R. 394).
* II.

Jacobsen Construction's Involvement in Safety Issues on the Project:
8.

The contract between the property owner, Novus Development

Corporation and Jacobsen Construction as the general contractor consists of two parts
with addenda and exhibits totaling well over 100 pages on a standard AIA format.
Plaintiffs brief has placed great emphasis on a phrase lifted from part of the contract
5

which he claims established Jacobsen Construction as "solely responsible for providing a
safe place for the performance of the work."
In fact, the full text of this section is as follows:
.1

The owner assumes no responsibility or liability for the
physical condition or safety at the project site or of any
improvements thereon. The design/builder shall be solely
responsible for providing a safe place for the performance of
the work.

(R. 285).
The purpose of this section is to relieve the owner, Novus, from any
responsibility for safety. It does not preclude subcontracting of safety functions to
appropriate subcontractors. The form subcontract agreement specifically provides for the
subcontractors to be responsible for safety for their own employees. (R. 201).
9.

At the time of the accident, Randy Brady was Jacobsen

Construction's on-site superintendent for the job. he had a trailer/office on site. He
described his job as:
To basically observe the progress of the construction and to
basically coordinate the different trades and get them involved
in the project at the right time and oversee their progress and
relate it back to the schedule and to kind of assure that the
project will be done on time.
(R. 309).
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10.

It was not part of Randy Brady's job assignment to make safety

audits of the job site or to review all of the subcontractor's safety procedures. He would
point out safety problems if he noticed them. (R. 330).
11.

There were three days on which Randy Brady observed steel workers

not tying off with their lanyard. He notified their supervisors. (R. 262 through 277).
12.

In his Daily Progress Report, Randy Brady made brief notes about

weather conditions. The Daily Progress Report's do not reflect any attempt to provide a
comprehensive weather report. (R. 262 through 277).
13.

OSHA requires all contractors and subcontractors to have their own

"competent person" on the job. Randy Brady would be the person considered, by OSHA,
to be the "competent person" for Jacobsen Construction on-site. (R. 324). However, this
designation cannot create any liability or duty upon Jacobsen Construction. The OSHA
Act itself explicitly states that none of its provisions:
Shall be construed to supersede or in any manner effect any
workman's compensation law, or to enlarge or diminish or
effect in any other manner the common law or statutory
rights, duties or liabilities of employers and employees under
any law with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of
employees arising out of, or in the course of, employment.
(29 USC § 653(b)(4)).
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14.

Plaintiffs reference to paragraph 2.C.8. of the Steel Erection

subcontract with Jacobsen Construction does not relate to the part of the job where the
accident occurred. This section applies to safety railing cable required to be installed at
the "mechanical penthouse areas and at roof openings." There were specific requirements
put in for the safety railing cable which was required to be left in place when Steel Deck
Erectors / Truco was finished. After that it was to be maintained by others. This railing
and cable, by its definition, has nothing to do with the area where Mr. Martinez was
injured. Steel Deck Erectors / Truco was in the process of putting up girders and then
putting steel roof decking on top of them. That part of the job utilized a very temporary
cabling system which would not be left in place. They would remove it when they put the
roof decking on. (R. 260).
15.

Prior to the commencement of work, Jacobsen Construction

provided a form titled "Subcontractor Pre-Construction Safety Checklist" to all
subcontractors. This form provided a large number of basic safety rules, including
requirements for hard hats, eye protection, drinking water, welding, gas cylinders, etc.
(R. 292 through 298).
16.

John Hymel was the Corporate Safety Director at Jacobsen

Construction's home office. In that position, Mr. Hymel had overall responsibility for the
8

company's safety programs, including employee training, inspections, accident
investigations, worker's compensation claims and drug and alcohol testing. (R. 347).
17.

Mr. Hymel was at the UPC Building site about once a month as

shown by his reports. His only visit to the site prior to plaintiffs accident was on August
19, 1997 before steel erection began. There was no effort to have Mr. Hymel to monitor
the safety conditions on the site on a daily basis. He simply made occasional inspections
to point out any safety problems he observed at that time. (R. 301 and 302).
III.

Plaintiffs Fall:
18.

Plaintiff recalls his fall from the girder but does not know why he

lost his balance. He does not attribute it to wind or to any other cause. Plaintiff testified:
Q.

A.

Q.

Now in the Complaint you have filed, if I remember
correctly, I think there was some suggestion that you
thought your lanyard had caught on something causing
you to fall?
Well, to be honest with you, I don't know what - when
I unhooked - because a lot of people asked me, how
did you fall, how did you fall. And I would just tell
them, well, the only thing I could really come up with
that I can even think of is maybe when I hooked my
lanyard back in there, then it might have got caught on
that post, but then if it would have been caught on that
post, chances are it would have - you know, it would
have been looped over it and It would have held you?
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A.
Q.
A.

Q.

A.

Q.
A.

It would have held me. But I don't know. I can't tell
you. I honestly don't know.
So you don't, for example, remember a big gust of
wind kind of just all of a sudden knocking you?
No. The only thing I can remember is when I was
going down I didn't want to land on my tools. And
then I don't remember anything after that.
So if I've got it correctly - and I want to get as accurate
as l e a n - you remember unclipping. You remember
taking one step after you undipped. And after that you
remember falling off the girder but you have no
recollection of why you would have fallen?
No, I remember taking one step and getting ready to
take another step over to the existing deck and
somehow I lost my balance and I went over.
Okay.
Then that's - and I don't know how that I - you know,
when I was in the hospital and all on - all doped up and
everything, I was telling those guys I know my lanyard
got hung-up. I know my lanyard got hung-up. But to
be honest with you, I don't know.

(R. 184).
19.

No one witnessed plaintiffs fall. Mr. Gogulski, plaintiffs expert

agreed there were many possible reasons that plaintiff fell from the girder, these include
simply losing his balance, catching his lanyard on something, being inattentive, and other
reasons. (R. 556).
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20.

The company supervisors for Steel Deck Erectors and Truco all

testified that there was nothing Jacobsen Construction affirmatively did that caused the
fall. (R. 185).
IV.

Plaintiffs Claims of Negligent Conduct Regarding Jacobsen Construction:
21.

In the Court below, plaintiff asserted three areas in which he claims

that Jacobsen Construction did something wrong:
1.

There was a three to four foot space from the end of the girder

to where Steel Deck Erectors / Truco had attached the safety cable post. He claims that
Randy Brady should have concluded that it was improper and should have forced them to
change it.
2.

Jacobsen Construction agreed to pay overtime to Truco's

employees in order to keep the job on schedule.
3.

Randy Brady did not tell the Truco people to stop working on

the day of plaintiff s accident despite strong winds.
A.

Jacobsen Construction Had No Involvement with Erecting or Monitoring
the Safety Cable System:
22.

A photograph of the safety cable and post attached to the girder in

the area where plaintiff fell (R. 569) is in the appendix.
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23.

The cable safety system was owned by Steel Deck Erectors / Truco.

They installed it and utilized it without any direction or interference from Jacobsen
Construction. (R. 183 and 549). The cable post was installed leaving a three to four foot
space from the end of the girder. This is consistent with industry practice to allow space
to work at the end of the girder while installing connecting bolts between the girder and
other steel pieces. (R. 492).
24.

Looking up from the ground, the safety cable system appeared to be

installed properly. (R. 549). Steve Trujillo, plaintiffs supervisor confirmed this as
follows:
Q.

A.
Q.
A.

As you look at that photograph [Appendix "A"] do you
see any problem with the way the safety cable and the
post is installed?
I can see nothing.
You don't see any problem with it?
No.

25.

The proper way to cross from the end of the girder to the roof deck,

(R. 551).

while being 100% tied-off, is to utilize a double lanyard harness like Mr. Martinez was
wearing. One lanyard is attached to the cable while the worker traverses to the roof deck
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and then attaches to a secure point on the roof deck which would have been out of sight
from the ground. The worker then goes back and releases the first lanyard. (R. 492).
26.

If no attachment was available on the roof, a worker could use other

methods such as a "choker" on a "retractable" to be tied-off while he crossed to the roof
deck. (R. 398).
27.

As the foreman for Truco on the job, it was plaintiffs responsibility

to be sure that cabling was installed so that the worker's could move about while being
100% tied-off. (R. 436 and 437).
28.

At the time of this accident, plaintiff was not tied off to anything.

This was in violation of the 100% tie-off rule.
B.

Plaintiffs Injury Was Not Caused By Excessive Overtime:
29.

Mr. Martinez first started work on the job site on August 29, 1997.

His last day of work was September 11, 1997, when the accident occurred. Over that
period of time he worked the following hours:
Friday, August 29, 1997

8 hours

Saturday, August 30, 1997
Sunday, August 31,1997
Monday, September 1, 1997
Tuesday, September 2, 1997
Wednesday, September 3, 1997
Thursday, September 4, 1997

5 hours
OFF
OFF
10 hours
8 hours
5 hours
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Friday, September 5, 1997
Saturday, September 6, 1997
Sunday, September 7, 1997
Monday, September 8, 1997
Tuesday, September 9, 1997
Wednesday, September 10, 1997

8 hours
5 hours
OFF
10 hours
10 hours
9 hours

Thursday, September 11, 1997

9.5 hours

(R. 286 through 288):
30.

Plaintiff liked working overtime. (R. 552). He does not believe that

fatigue caused his fall. If he had felt any fatigue on the day of the accident, he would
have felt comfortable telling his supervisor that he needed to leave the job. (R. 552).
31.

Plaintiffs expert, Paul Gogulski, gave testimony confirming that Mr.

Martinez did not work an inappropriate number of overtime hours:
Q.

A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Is it your opinion that if Mr. Martinez had only worked
7 hours that day this accident would not have
happened?
No I did not say that. I am talking about the
cumulative effect Mr. Martinez and anyone else in the
iron worker trade working 10 hours for a sustained
period of time being more accident prone than those
who work 8 or 7 hours.
And you used the expression "sustained period of
time," that means a series of days, correct?
Yes.
But are you able to tell me what number of days would
constitute a "sustained period of time" as you define it?
Not exactly.
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Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Are you able to give me a range as to what number of
days would constitute a "sustained period of time?"
In my opinion, that range is between 7 and 10 days.
And that would be continual days, one after another?
Yes.

32.

As will be noted from the above review, plaintiff never worked more

(R. 553).

than 6 days in a row. He never even worked 40 hours in a calendar week.
Mr. Gogulski's opinion, as applied to this case, indicates that the overtime plaintiff
worked was appropriate. In fact, Mr. Gogulski himself has ordered overtime for workers
on jobs where they were required to work 12 hour shifts 7 days a week for more than 10
days, which he found to be safe. (R. 553).
C.

Cessation of Work Due to Wind:
33.

All of the witnesses connected with iron work have uniformly

testified that persons who are able to judge the wind and to determine when work should
be stopped are the crane operator (a Steel Deck Erectors' employee) and the people
working on the steel, such as Mr. Martinez. (R. 430, 451, 452, 494, 553 and 554). As
plaintiff supervisor, Steve Trujillo, explained:
Q.
A.

How do you decide whether it is too windy to work?
When the crane can no longer operate, pretty much, or
you can't stand up on the iron, I mean, its just a little
15

Q.

A.

common knowledge. You've got to keep in mind that I
was on the ground and its always different in the air
than on the ground. I mean a lot of times I let my men
make the call who are in the air.
And that's because they are going to be able to feel the
wind much better than you, correct?
Yes.

(R.451 and 452).
34.

Jacobsen Construction never told Steve Trujillo to work in unsafe

conditions. Steve Trujillo had no discussions with Jacobsen Construction about wind on
the job. He understood that he had authority to bring his men down from the steel if he
felt it was too windy to be safe. In fact, that is exactly what he did. No one from
Jacobsen Construction ever questioned his decisions about whether to work or not due to
weather conditions. (R. 462 through 466).
35.

While the ultimate decision of when to stop work belongs to the

foreman of the erection subcontractorfSteve Trujillo), plaintiff knew that he had the Tight
to come down from the steel if he considered the wind to be unsafe. He explained:
Q.
A.

Did it seem to change through the day or was it pretty
much the same kind of wind speed the whole day?
I think it was pretty much the same. I don't know.
Well, something made Steve awfully mad. The wind
blowing his prints away, him saying, "lets just get the
hell out of here." So, I think we all pretty - well had
enough of it. We'd put up with it all day.
16

Q.

A.

At any time during the day did you tell Steve that you
thought you should not be working because the wind
was too strong?
I don't believe I did. I was -1 was a lot younger and
stronger then. It didn't really - that kind of sh
really
didn't bother me.
Was it your understanding in your relationship with
your employer that if you felt unsafe due to wind or
some other condition that you had the right to get off
the job.
Yes, everybody knows that.

36.

Steve Trujillo, as foreman for Steel Deck Erectors had the authority

A.

Q.

(R. 393).

to pull his people off the job if he felt the wind was too strong. At the time the accident
occurred, he had made that decision and decided to have his men quit for the day. He did
not consult with Jacobsen Construction about it. He did not need their approval. Plaintiff
was injured as he was leaving the job after Mr. Trujillo had decided to end work for that
day. (R. 393).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs injury in this case is self-caused. He chose to ignore his
company's directives and walk on the steel girder without being "tied-off." If there was
any deficiency in the location of the safety cable, or in tie-off points on the roof, it was his
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job to correct it. He does not know why he fell from the girder but it was his own choice
to proceed without being tied-off which would have prevented his injury.
Plaintiff has based his claim against Jacobsen Construction under § 414 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. This section known as the "Retained Control
Doctrine" provides that the employer of a subcontractor may have a duty to prevent harm
to others arising from the activities of the independent contractor if that employer "retains
control of any part of the work."
In the case of Thompson v. Jess, 979 P.2d 322 (Utah 1999), the Utah
Supreme Court analyzed this section in detail and joined with the majority of case law
that holds that the § 414 duty only arises in circumstances where the employer "actively
participates" in controlling those aspects of the subcontractor's work that actually cause
the accident. The Court stated that liability could not be based upon non-action on the
part of the employer. To the contrary, in order to have liability under this section, the
Court ruled that the employer of the subcontractor must exercise either "direct
management of the means and methods of the independent contractor's activities or must
have provided the specific equipment that caused the injury." (979 P.2 327).
In this case, there is no such "active participation." Steel Deck Erectors /
Truco was hired as an independent contractor because of their expertise in steel erection.
18

They provided all of their own safety equipment. They were the experts. Jacobsen
Construction did not direct any of their methods of work or methods of erecting safety
equipment.
Plaintiffs claims against Jacobsen Construction are based upon the
allegations of passivity and non-action. Under the Thompson case these allegations
cannot support a claim of a legal duty. This conclusion is consistent with the testimony of
plaintiffs own expert, Paul Gogulski who stated:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Did anyone actively to your knowledge push or in any
way cause Mr. Martinez to fall, actively?
No.
Your criticism on Jacobsen Construction is not for
what they did but for what they did not do; correct?
That is correct.

(R. 564).
The Utah law on this point is consistent with the trend of legal thought and
case law from surrounding States. It is also consistent with the earlier Utah case of
Dayton v. Free, 148 P. 408 (Utah 1914) and Federal Court decisions interpreting Utah
law. Plaintiffs various factual assertions in support of his claim of duty have been
rejected by case law.
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Additionally, even if a duty existed, plaintiff has no evidence to
demonstrate that Jacobsen Construction was negligent or a proximate cause of the injury.
The safety cable utilized by Steel Deck Erectors / Truco appeared to be properly installed
when viewed from the ground where Jacobsen Construction personnel were located.
Furthermore, the only witness to the fall, plaintiff, does not blame his fall on the wind.
He simply does not know why he fell which would leave the cause of his fall to complete
speculation.
In sum, plaintiff has caused his own injury by failing to follow established
safety procedures. It was not Jacobsen Construction's duty to watch him at all times and
force him to comply.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
UNDER CONTROLLING AUTHORITY, JACOBSEN CONSTRUCTION DID
NOT "RETAIN CONTROL" SO AS TO CREATE A DUTY TO PLAINTIFF.
Plaintiff bases his entire claim against Jacobsen Construction on the
"Retained Control" Doctrine of § 414 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. In the case
of Thompson v. Jess, supra, the Utah Supreme Court extensively reviewed and clarified
its position on the "Retained Control" Doctrine. The Court's decision dealt with the
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doctrine in the context of an "employer of an independent contractor." The Court used
that phrase to include a property owner, a general contractor or anyone else who might
hire an independent contractor. Thus, although the Thompson case dealt with a
homeowner who hired the subcontractor, its reasoning is equally applicable in the present
case involving a general contractor.
In the Thompson case, the Utah Supreme Court restricted the "Retained
Control" Doctrine to situations in which the employer of an independent contractor has
"actively participated" in the work. It defined the standard as follows:
Under the "active participation" standard, a principal
employer is subject to liability for injuries arising out of its
independent contractor's work if the employer is actively
involved in, or asserts control over, the manner of
performance of the contract work. See Conklin v. Cohen, 287
So.2d 56, 60 (Fla. 1973) (holding that under the "active
participation" standard, principal employer must directly
influence the manner in which the work is performed: no duty
arises from "passive non-participation.") Such an assertion of *
control occurs, for example, when the principal employer
directs that the contracted work be done by use of a certain
mode or otherwise interferes with the means and methods by
which the work is to be accomplished.) See eg Lewis v. NJ.
Reibe Enterprises, Inc., 170 Ariz. 384, 825 P.2 5, 7 - 8 (1992)
(imposing liability where a subcontractor's employee was
injured as the result of a new, less safe method of work
required by the general contractor.); Redinger v. Living, Inc.,
689 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex. 1985) (imposing liability where a
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subcontractor was ordered to operate a backhoe dangerously
close to plaintiff.)
979 P.2d at 327. (Emphasis Added).
In its opinion, the Court recognized the confusion that has occurred because
of the use of the word "retained." Some cases had suggested that the mere retention of
any power to control the work, shut down the job site or discharge individual workers
would meet the "retained control" standard, even if that power was not exercised. In
Thompson, the Utah Supreme Court specifically rejected that interpretation. It clarified
the issue in a footnote as follows:
We note that the term "Retained Control" Doctrine is
somewhat of a misnomer. Under the standards announced
herein, a duty of care is imposed if the principal employer
asserts affirmative control over or actually participates
actively in the manner of performing the contracted work.
"Retained" to the extent the word implies passivity or nonaction is inapt.
979 P.2d at 328 footnote 3.
The Thompson Court further elaborated on the "active participation"
standard as follows:
In other words, to have "actively participated" in the
contracted work, a principal employer must have exercised
affirmative control over the method or operative detail of that
work, [citation] "The degree of control necessary for the
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creation of a legal duty must involve either the direct
management of the means and methods of the independent
contractor's activities or the provision of the specific
equipment that caused the injury."
Although the requisite level of control over the contractor's
manner or method of work does not rise to the level of
creating a master/servant relationship [citation] the principal
employer must exert such control over the means utilized that
the contractor cannot carry out the injury causing aspect of the
work in his or her own way.
979 P.2 at 327. (Emphasis Added).
The active participation of the general contractor must relate directly to the
actual cause of the injury. In this case, plaintiff is asserting that his injury was caused
because a three to four foot space was left from the end of the safety cable to the end of
the girder. Jacobsen Construction did not provide the safety equipment. That equipment
was provided by Steel Deck Erectors / Truco. If Jacobsen Construction had directed and
required that the cable be installed in that manner, plaintiff might have an argument for
the creation of the duty under the Thompson case. However, it was Steel Deck Erectors /
Truco who made the decision on how to install the cable system. They used their own
methods and means. Jacobsen Construction was not involved.
Plaintiffs factual assertions upon which he claims the existence of a duty
are:
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1.

That Jacobsen Construction did not tell Steel Deck Erectors / Truco

to have a smaller space at the end of the girder.
2.

That Jacobsen Construction did not tell Steel Deck Erectors / Truco

to stop work because the wind was too strong.
3.

That Jacobsen Construction had held a pre-construction meeting and

distributed general safety checklist requirements to Steel Deck Erectors / Truco as its
subcontractor.
4.

That Jacobsen Construction wanted to keep the contract on schedule

and had authorized overtime.
5.

That Jacobsen Construction had the power to stop the project at any

time.
These facts do not show "active participation" in the cause of the injury.
Therefore, there is no duty.
The Thompson Court cited the case of Erwin v. Kern River Gas
Transmission Company, 1979 WL 804238 (Tex. App.) as a proper interpretation of Utah
law. The Kern River case involved a contract and subcontract in the construction of the
Kern River Pipeline in Utah. The plaintiff was an employee of a subcontractor who was
injured on the job. As in the present case, plaintiff argued that Kern River's economic
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pressure and acceleration of the work schedule brought it into "active participation" by
hurrying the project without regard to safety.
The Court rejected that argument. The Court commented:
An independent contractor undoubtedly always has incentive
to do that which its principal employer wants done, within the
time it wants that done. Such economic pressure, which
appears to exist here, is not tantamount to Kern River's
directing or controlling the day-to-day manner of doing
APC's work, or the means and methods by which the results
were to be accomplished. Control of the overall schedule
should not suffice.
1997 WL 804238 at pg. 7.
The Thompson Court also cited with approval the case of Simon v. Deery
Oil, 699 F. Supp. 257 (Utah 1988). In that case, plaintiff Simon was an employee of
Deery Oil. Deery Oil entered into a contract with Kennecott Corporation for the lining of
chemical evaporation ponds. Plaintiff was injured on the job and sued Kennecott. As in
the present case, plaintiff put heavy reliance on the fact that Kennecott had required a list
of general safety rules to be incorporated into its contract with Deery Oil. He argued that
by imposing those rules, Kennecott retained control over the construction project. The
Court rejected that argument. It found that the mere promulgation of safety rules as a
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requirement to a subcontractor did not constitute "active participation" as required under
Utah law.
In Thompson, the Utah Supreme Court specifically referenced and approved
the reasoning of the Simon and Kern River cases. (979 P.2d 327).
In his brief, plaintiff has cited the Court to the unpublished case of Hale v.
Danny's Construction Company, Inc., 210 F.3d 389, 2000 WL 358409 (10th Cir. Utah).
The facts in that case are essentially identical to the facts in Mr. Martinez's case. A steel
worker fell from the structure. He was not using safety lanyards. The general contractor
had superintendents on site who had not taken action. Based on those facts, Judge Tena
Campbell found no duty from the general contractor to the steel worker. The 10th Circuit
affirmed her dismissal of the plaintiffs case. Because the facts are not fully outlined in
the 10th Circuit decision, defendant submitted a copy of the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law entered at the trial level is in the record (R. 599 through 617). Judge
Campbell based her decision on the same facts that have been established in this case.
The Hale case involved a general contract under which the general
contractor was responsible for supervising safety. There was a subcontract with Danny's
which provided that Danny's was responsible for the safety of its employees. There was
a pre-construction meeting held by the general contractor discussing safety rules,
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including tie-offs. OSHA standards required tie-offs. The general contractor had on-site
superintendents. They had the right to point out safety problems to Danny's supervisors,
the right to direct that unsafe workers be fired, and the right to stop work on the job. Hale
fell while performing the exact same job as Martinez without being tied-off.
Judge Campbell's decision was issued before the Thompson case was
published. She based her conclusions on its predecessor Utah case, Dayton v. Free, 148
P. 408 (Utah 1914). Judge Campbell concluded that even though the general contractor
had superintendents who could have intervened to correct the unsafe practices, it had not
"actively participated" in the cause of the injury. The 10th Circuit affirmed her
conclusions citing the Thompson case which had been issued in the mean time.
The plaintiffs claim in this case is identical.
Plaintiffs citation to Scudder v. Kennecott Copper Corporation, 886 P.2d 48
(1994) does not support his claim. It did not involve a consideration of § 414 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. It did not involve the "Retained Control" Doctrine.
While it was a work-place injury case, the plaintiffs claims against the defendants were
fully settled before the appeal was heard. The case was concerned with indemnity
contracts between the various parties and the jury verdict that found no fault on the part of
the contractor, Weyher-Livsey. The Scudder case is irrelevant.
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The plaintiff has also cited a large number of cases from other jurisdictions
attempting to suggest that there is some fact that would prevent a summary judgement on
the "retained control" issue in this case. Utah law does not support this argument. The
facts that plaintiff claims create "active participation" in this case have been rejected by
Utah ease law in Thompson or by cases cited with approval in the decision. As in the
Thompson and Simon cases supra, this case is appropriate for summary judgement.
Plaintiff has also referenced the cases of Grahn v. Tosco Corp., 68 Cal.
Rptr.2d 806 (Cal. App. 1997); Redinger v. Living, Inc., 689 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1985);
Conklin v. Cohen, 287 So.2d 56 (Fla. 1973); and Lewis v. N.J. Reibe Enterprises, Inc.,
825 P.2d 5 (Ariz. 1992). All of these cases were cited by the Utah Supreme Court in the
Thompson case. They provide no support for plaintiffs claims.
The Thompson case cited the Grahn case for the principle that:
In other words, to have "actively participated" in the
contracted work, a principal employer must have exercised
affirmative control over the method or operative detail of that
work.
979 P.2d at 327.
Similarly, the Court cited the Conklin case for the principle that:
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Under "active participation" standard, principal employer
must directly influence the manner in which the work is
performed; no duty arises from "passive non-participation."
979 P.2d at 327.
The Court cited the Lewis and Redinger cases as examples of evidence that
would support a finding that the general contractor had "actively participated." These
cases provide insight into the type of fact situations that will support a finding of a duty.
In the Lewis case, plaintiff was an employee of a carpentry subcontractor.
They had installed some plywood roof sheets incorrectly. He was on the roof carefully
removing the individual sheets and reinstalling them properly. This was a slow process.
The general contractor's superintendent, instructed the carpenters to move faster by
knocking all of the plywood sheets loose from underneath using a 2 X 4. Lewis was up
on the roof reattaching the plywood. The method directed by the general contractor's
superintendent created the hazard of many loose pieces of plywood on the roof. As a
result of that hazard, Lewis was injured when one of the pieces of plywood shifted and he
fell. The Arizona Court found that there was "active participation" because the general
contractor had intervened and specifically directed a method of doing the work that
created the hazard that caused the injury.
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Similarly, in the Redinger case, the injury resulted because the
superintendent for the general contractor "actively participated" in controlling the work.
In that case, the superintendent specifically directed one subcontractor to operate heavy
machinery in extremely close proximity to the unprotected employees of a different
contractor. The general contractor thereby created the dangerous circumstance which
resulted in the injury when the heavy equipment hit plaintiff.
The Thompson opinion cites both these cases as examples of "active
participation" when the general contractor gives directions that create the dangerous
circumstance. There is no such event in this case. Jacobsen Construction did not give
any direction to Steel Deck Erectors / Truco with regard to their work methods. Jacobsen
Construction never directed the use of unsafe practices.
Plaintiffs claim is similar to the case of Hooker v. Department of
Transportation, 38 P.3d 1081 (Cal. 2002). In the Hooker case, plaintiffs decedent was a
crane operator working for a contractor. Defendant Cal Trans had hired the contractor to
work on an overpass. Mr. Hooker's crane normally had extended outriggers when it was
operating to prevent a tip over. However, the width of the crane with its outriggers
extended obstructed traffic on the overpass where it was operating. Mr. Hooker would
periodically retract the outriggers to let construction vehicles pass. He was killed when
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he retracted the outriggers and then apparently forgot to re-extend them. When he swung
the boom of the crane over the edge of the overpass it caused the crane to tip over and he
was crushed.
After collecting worker's compensation, Mr. Hooker's widow sued
defendant Cal Trans as the hirer of his employer. She claimed that because Cal Trans had
control of the job site and had the ability to shut it down for safety violations and that Cal
Trans therefore owed a duty to Hooker to prevent him from operating unsafely. The
evidence showed the Cal Trans had never directed the crane operator to retract his
outriggers. However, the Cal Trans superintendents were aware that he was doing so.
The California Supreme Court, applying the Utah case of Thompson v. Jess,
upheld the dismissal of the plaintiffs claim on summary judgement. It stated:
Plaintiff failed to raise triable issues and material fact as to
whether defendant actually exercised the retained control so
as to affirmatively contribute to the death of plaintiffs
husband. While the evidence suggests that the crane tipped
over because the crane operator swung the boom while the
outriggers were retracted, and that the crane operator had a
practice of retracting the outriggers to permit construction
traffic to pass the crane on the overpass, there was no
evidence that Cal Trans's exercise of retained control over
safety conditions at the site affirmatively contributed to the
adoption of that practice by the crane operator. There was at
most evidence that Cal Trans's safety personnel were aware
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of an unsafe practice and failed to exercise the authority they
retained to correct it.
38P.3datl092.
In this appeal, plaintiff is asking this Court to ignore the Utah Supreme
Court's analysis of the "active participation" standard in the Thompson case and to
establish a rule under which is inconsistent with the cases cited therein. This argument
not only violates controlling case law but also runs contrary to common sense and good
public policy. Essentially, plaintiff is suggesting that any general contractor who retains
the right to set general safety standards and to point out safety deficiencies if they are
noticed, will become, m effect, an insurer of the safety of a subcontractor's workers and
always subject to suit. Such a rule ignores the reality of the construction business. Steel
Deck Erectors / Truco was hired as a subcontractor because of its expertise in the
business. It makes no sense to require a general contractor, who does not have the
expertise on site to supervise and regulate the manner and methods of work of its expert
subcontractors.
Plaintiffs suggestion that Mr. Brady, by the mere fact that he noticed some
safety problems and called them to the attention of Steel Deck Erectors / Truco somehow
becomes responsible for all safety procedures is contrary to good public policy. The
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Courts have never attempted to create a rule that would penalize anyone for pointing out a
safety problem to someone else. If merely pointing out some safety problems suddenly
makes Mr. Brady and Jacobsen Construction responsible for any safety failure on the job,
the free exchange of safety information would be severely chilled.
POINT II
EVEN IF THE COURT WERE TO FIND THAT JACOBSEN CONSTRUCTION
HAD SOME DUTY TO PLAINTIFF, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO INDICATE
THAT JACOBSEN CONSTRUCTION WAS NEGLIGENT OR A PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF THE INJURY.
As noted above, plaintiffs allegations of negligence against Jacobsen
Construction now consist of the following:
1.

That there was a three to four foot space from the end of the girder to

where the safety post was placed that plaintiff claims was improper. Jacobsen
Construction's personnel could see the space from the ground. Plaintiff criticizes
Jacobsen Construction for not causing the post to be moved.
2.

That due to scheduling problems, Steel Deck Erectors / Truco was

authorized to work overtime.
3.

That on the day of the accident it became too windy and Jacobsen

Construction did not force Steel Deck Erectors / Truco to stop working.
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These are all claims of "non-action." They do not meet the standard for
"retained control" delineated in the Thompson case.
In addition, there is no basis for a finding of negligence or proximate cause
with regard to any of these alleged failures to act.
A.

The Post and Cable System Attached to the Girder Was Properly Done:
At several points in their brief, plaintiff makes the unsupported claim that

the post and cable system were installed incorrectly. They suggest that Steel Deck
Erectors / Truco, even though they were the owners of the post and cable system and
supplied it to the job, did not know what they were doing when they installed it. They
suggest that Randy Brady, who is not a steel erection expert, should have concluded that
they were doing it wrong. The facts do not support this claim. All of the steel workers
who have testified in this case have stated that the post and cable system was properly
installed in accordance with industry standards. There should have been other points to
tie-off on the roof deck itself which would not have been visible from the ground.
Consequently, even if Mr. Brady was a steel erection expert, there was nothing for him to
observe from the ground that would suggest any problem with the installation of the cable
and post. There would be no reason for him to interfere with Steel Deck Erectors /
Truco's utilization of its own safety equipment.
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B.

Overtime Was Not Improperly Scheduled or a Factor in Causing Plaintiffs
Injury:
The facts show that plaintiff did not work an excessive amount of overtime.

In fact, he never worked as much as 40 hours in a calendar week on the job. Plaintiffs
own expert, Mr. Gogulski has offered the opinion that overtime might become excessive
in the event a worker is required to work 7 to 10 days straight of overtime each day. The
plaintiff never worked such a schedule on this job.
Not only is there a lack of evidence of inappropriate overtime, plaintiff
himself, the only witness to the accident, has testified that fatigue was not a factor. There
is no evidence of overtime being inappropriate or being a cause of the injury.
C.

Failure to Direct Work Stoppage Due to Wind:
Plaintiff and all of his co-workers have testified that the persons most able

to determine whether iron work should be stopped due to windy conditions were the
workers themselves. Plaintiff, his co-workers and the crane operator had the ability to
judge any problem with the wind. Mr. Brady, whether he was walking on the ground or
in his trailer / office would not have that information or ability to judge the effect of the
wind. The steel workers have all testified that their foreman had the power and
responsibility to make the final determination as to wind conditions. The plaintiff himself
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was the foreman for Truco. He never determined the wind was a problem. Steve
Trujillo, as foreman for Steel Deck Erectors, ultimately made the decision to terminate
work a Vz hour early.
In addition, there is no evidence to support the conclusion that the wind
proximately caused the accident. Plaintiff (the only witness) has testified that he has no
knowledge of why he fell. He did not remember wind pushing him off. Plaintiffs expert
admitted that there could be many reasons for Mr. Martinez to fall, including his initial
report that he caught his lanyard on something that threw his balance off. Any
determination as to the actual cause of the fall is sheer speculation.
Determinations of negligence and proximate cause are normally to be made
by the fact finder at trial. But in an appropriate case, the Court may make that
determination when reasonable minds could not differ. In the present case, none of the
three claims of negligence have any factual basis.
CONCLUSION
A review of the facts submitted by plaintiff show that none of them can
support his legal theory of "retained control" under Utah law. At best, his allegations
point to "non-action" on the part of Jacobsen Construction. The Utah Supreme Court has
concluded that "active participation" is required in order to create a duty of the general
36

contractor. There is no "active participation" and therefore the summary judgement was
properly granted.
In addition, plaintiff has been unable to delineate any negligent act on the
part of Jacobsen Construction. The cabling system on the girder was installed in
accordance with industry standards, overtime is not an issue and Jacobsen Construction
was not in a position to make a determination with regard to the risk of wind.
Plaintiff is the cause of his own accident. He consciously decided to
proceed without being tied-off in violation of his company's directions. For some reason
he lost his balance and fell. His only source of recovery is worker's compensation. He
has no claim against Jacobsen Construction.
The summary judgement issued by the lower Court should be affirmed.
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